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The purpose of this analysis is not to get into
a discussion of whether a little deflation is com-
patible with prosperity, although within limits it
may be. The more important point is that, with-
out question, substantial deflation is inconsistent
with prosperity. Thus, deflation is every bit as
serious an issue as inflation; however, the U.S.
economy today does not run any significant risk
of deflation.
Obviously, not everyone agrees with this
judgment. Based on a few recent observations of
month-to-month price changes, some commenta-
tors have used the “D” word to express their con-
cern about the current state of the U.S. economy.
The objective in this paper is to explore this sub-
ject and, we hope, make a contribution to public
understanding of the issue.
First, we will elaborate on what we believe is
the appropriate objective for Federal Reserve
policy. Second, we will explain the generally
accepted definitions of inflation and deflation,
and discuss the fundamental sources of these
phenomena. Third, we will review aspects of
price behavior in our economy and discuss how
data should be interpreted to determine the infla-
tionary or deflationary state of the economy.
Finally, although the issue concerns the behavior
of the aggregate price level, we will examine
some particular sectoral price changes to help
better understand the aggregate price level.
F
lation”—not inflation, not deflation—
is lifted from the title of a book by Abba
P. Lerner.1 For the past 35 years in the
United States and, indeed, in most of
the world, policymakers and the public in general
have been focused on the issue of inflation—
that is, the continual upward drift in prices of
the overwhelming fraction of goods and services
produced in the economy. Sometimes the drift
was more of a gallop. For most of this period,
the upward trend was also characteristic of the
prices of assets such as land, houses, and equities.
Inflation, prevalent though it has been in our
recent economic experience, has not been the
norm for most of U.S. history. In the early 1930s,
exactly the opposite experience occurred: defla-
tion, or a continual downward drift in the prices
of goods, services, and assets.
Deflation has a frightening history. Simultan-
eously with the deflation of the early 1930s, the
U.S. unemployment rate soared to about 25 per-
cent in 1933 at the depth of the Great Depression.
Although deflation ended in 1933, the damage to
the economy was so great that poor economic
conditions persisted until the United States
became involved in World War II in 1941. More-
over, the economic history of the 1990s in Japan
is characterized by deflation. The Japanese econ-
omy has stagnated, and unemployment there has
risen today to levels not seen in over 40 years.
From these and other episodes around the world,
many people associate deflation with “hard times.”
1 Lerner, Abba P. Flation. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972.
“THE APPROPRIATE POLICY
OBJECTIVE FOR THE FEDERAL
RESERVE
Our monetary policy framework is this. First
and foremost, the central bank must maintain a
commitment to price stability. An operational
definition of price stability is an environment in
which the inflation rate, properly measured and
averaged over several years, is zero. All of our
inflation data are subject to measurement errors.
Experts in such measurements generally agree
that current price indexes, despite statisticians’
best efforts, still leave inflation measures that have
some upward bias. Hence, in terms of the various
inflation indexes, we can say that price stability
prevails when broad price indexes exhibit small
positive average values for measured inflation
and that year-to-year fluctuations around that
average are well contained.
If the price level comes unstuck, yielding
inflation or deflation, all sorts of other problems
will arise. Nevertheless, within the confines of
the goal of price stability, the central bank has
some flexibility to lean against fluctuations in
output and employment. However, the central
bank ought not to pursue the goal of stabilizing
economic activity so aggressively that it runs any
substantial risk of compromising the goal of price
stability.
Finally, in leaning against fluctuations in
growth and employment, the central bank ought
not to have goals for levels of the economy’s
growth and unemployment rates per se. Within
a wide range, no one knows what the economy’s
equilibrium rate of growth is or what rate of
unemployment will clear the labor market in the
long run. The biggest risks of a major monetary
policy mistake occur if a central bank attempts
to target the levels of real variables.
Achieving the objective of price stability, as
defined above, will yield a highly stable economy.
When the market has confidence in Fed policy,
short-run changes—that is, over a few months or
even a few quarters—in the rate of inflation or
deflation will tend to be self-reversing rather
than self-reinforcing.
THE DEFINITION AND SOURCES
OF INFLATION AND DEFLATION
At the beginning of the great inflation of
1965-80, there was a wide disparity of professional
opinion about the fundamental source of inflation
or deflation in an economy. One proposition came
to be known as the “monetarist view.” This view
held that sustained inflation or deflation was
always a monetary phenomenon; that is, that the
only source of long-run positive or negative trends
in the general level of prices in an economy is the
creation of an excess or insufficient supply of
money balances relative to the growth of the pro-
ductive capacity of that economy. Milton Friedman
of the University of Chicago was the most publicly
visible proponent of this proposition. The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, in particular the presi-
dent of the Bank at that time, Darryl Francis, and
the Research staff were vocal advocates of this
proposition in the policy arena during the late
1960s and early 1970s. A reading of the Memoran-
dum of Discussion of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) for this period makes clear
that there were sharp debates over these issues.
The FOMC is the Fed’s main monetary policymak-
ing body, and the public record of that period
shows that Darryl Francis was a vigorous advo-
cate of the monetarist view.
The proposition that the central bank is the
source of ongoing inflation or deflation was a
distinct minority view 35 years ago. In the FOMC,
Darryl Francis was usually the only one expressing
this view. The development of economic theory
and the economic history of the past three decades
have produced a major change in both professional
thinking and public attitudes toward the sources
of inflation and deflation. Economists are now
largely in agreement that if the central bank does
not achieve the goal of price stability, no one else
can. Many central banks around the world, starting
with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990,
have acknowledged this responsibility and have
adopted explicit numeric inflation targets.
This view also spread into public thinking
about inflation in the United States. Paul Volcker,
former chairman of the Board of Governors of
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for the disinflation that occurred in the United
States in the early 1980s. Chairman Greenspan is
applauded for the additional progress in the 1990s
that brought the U.S. inflation rate to the lowest
level in almost 40 years.
Today the Federal Reserve accepts its respon-
sibility for the trend rate of inflation. However, a
central bank is not responsible for month-to-
month wiggles in the inflation statistics. Nor
should a central bank attempt to react to short-run
variations, since the sources of such noise are
beyond its control and likely to average out over
a period of a few months or at most a couple of
years. One obvious reason for not reacting to short-
run developments is that an unknown part of
these changes in the reported inflation rate is
purely measurement error, or statistical noise.
Professional opinion has also changed about
the source of deflation in the 1930s. It is now
widely acknowledged that, at a minimum, the
intensity of the Great Depression was magnified
by the failure of the Federal Reserve to provide
sufficient liquidity to the economy in the face of
widespread bank failures. The Federal Reserve
in turn has learned from that experience. When
the U.S. economy has been threatened by liquidity
crises in recent years—such as the stock market
crash of 1987, the Asian crises and Russian default
of 1998, and the terrorist attack of September 11,
2001—the Fed has moved rapidly to inject large
amounts of liquidity into the economy. Liquidity
crises have been averted, inflation has remained
low and stable, and deflation has not occurred.
Experience elsewhere has not been as
benign. Over the period from 1981 through 1990,
the Japanese economy grew at an annual rate of
3.7 percent and the inflation rate (measured by
the gross domestic product [GDP] price index)
averaged 1.5 percent per year. The situation in
Japan in the 1990s has been remarkably different.
The Japanese economy has struggled in and out
of recession, and real growth from 1991 to 2000
averaged only 1.1 percent. Over the same period,
very low inflation has turned into deflation. From
1991 to 1996, the Japanese consumption deflator
rose at an average annual rate of only 0.5 percent;
for 1996 to 2000, the rate was –0.2 percent. Asset
prices fell dramatically. The decline of the Nikkei
equity price index from a value of close to 40,000
in late 1989 to its recent level of less than 10,000
is common knowledge. What is not as well known
outside Japan is that land and real estate prices
over the past decade have experienced equally
dramatic declines as those seen in equity markets.
In April 1993 an index of housing prices in Japan
stood at 42.35 million yen. By April 2001 it had
fallen to 36.52 million yen, an annual average rate
of decline of 1.7 percent.2 The index of residential
land prices reached a peak in March 1991 of 109.7
and fell to 81.7 by September 2001, an annual
average rate of decline of 2.4 percent. The decline
in commercial land prices was even larger. From
a peak of 111.7 in September 1991, the index of
these prices fell to 49.1 in September 2001, an
annual average rate of decline of 5.6 percent.3 In
terms of the impact on Japan’s output and employ-
ment, the large deflation of asset prices was prob-
ably more important than the gentle deflation of
goods prices.
What is responsible for the incredible differ-
ence in the performance of the Japanese economy
between the 1980s and 1990s? Japan’s money stock
(using Japan’s own preferred measure, M2 + CDs)
grew at an average annual rate of 7.9 percent from
1981 through 1990, but only at 2.3 percent per
year over the decade from 1991 through 2000. A
conclusion consistent with research on this issue
is that the ongoing stagnation and deflation that
the Japanese economy has experienced in the
past decade is likely related to an insufficient
supply of liquidity by the Bank of Japan. Slow
money growth is not the whole story, but is cer-
tainly a significant part of it.
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2 The Housing Loan Progress Association. “Price Survey of the Housing Market.” <http://jin.jcic.or.jp/stat/stats/>.
2 National Land Agency.RECENT PRICE BEHAVIOR IN
THE U.S. ECONOMY
Public discussion of inflation in the United
States generally is focused on the consumer price
index (CPI) published monthly by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The monthly change in the over-
all CPI is the so-called “headline” inflation num-
ber. The CPI is very visible; it has been widely
reported for years and is used to construct cost-
of-living adjustments in union wage contracts
and Social Security benefits.
Sometimes reference is also made to a “core”
inflation rate, usually measured by the CPI exclud-
ing prices of food and energy products. The ration-
ale for excluding food and energy prices is that
they can be quite volatile, and hence longer-term
inflation trends can be obscured when they are
included.
Starting in 2000, the FOMC chose to focus on
a different measure of inflation: changes in the
price index for personal consumption expendi-
tures in the national income accounts. This meas-
ure of inflation, which for convenience we will
call the “consumption price index,” is reported
monthly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of
the Department of Commerce. Although this index
receives less public attention than the CPI, it is
preferred by the FOMC because the methodology
used in its construction reduces the measurement
bias relative to that in the CPI; also, the coverage
of goods and services in this index is believed to
better represent consumption patterns. For exam-
ple, prices of medical services are included in the
CPI only to the extent that such services are paid
directly by consumers. Prices of all medical serv-
ices are included in the consumption price index
whether those services are paid for directly by
consumers or are paid for on behalf of consumers
by third parties such as insurance companies.
In recent years, inflation as measured by the
consumption price index has been lower than
that measured by the CPI.4 Although the following
discussion will refer primarily to the consump-
tion price index, no important issues depend on
whether the focus is on that index or the CPI.
What should we expect to observe in an
economy where price stability prevails? If it were
possible to measure the average level of prices
with little or no bias in such an economy, then
over a period of time an average measured infla-
tion rate very close to zero should be observed.
From month-to-month or quarter-to-quarter, posi-
tive or negative changes of the inflation index
will occur, but over time these would average
out to about zero.
What about prices of individual goods and
services under such conditions? There would
likely be a dispersion of changes in the prices of
individual goods and services around zero. In
fact, prices of some goods and services could be
continually falling, while prices of other goods
and services could be continually rising. It is
perfectly normal to experience divergent trends
of individual prices under conditions of overall
price stability. Thus, trends in the prices of indi-
vidual goods or services cannot be used to judge
whether an economy is experiencing inflation or
deflation.
An important influence on inflation data in
the United States over the past three years has
been the behavior of energy prices on world mar-
kets. In 1998, energy prices collapsed as world
demand dropped dramatically in response to the
crises in Asian economies. Petroleum inventories
rose unexpectedly and major producers, including
OPEC nations, cut production to stabilize prices
and adjust inventories. In 1999 and 2000, energy
prices rose sharply as economic activity boomed
in the United States and other major industrialized
economies at a time when world inventories of
oil were particularly low. Leading up to 2002,
as the U.S. economy sank into recession and
economic growth slowed in Europe, energy
4 In August 2002 the Bureau of Labor Statistics introduced a new measure of consumer prices—the chained consumer price index for all
urban consumers (C-CPI-U). Monthly data are available from December 1999. The objective of the new index is to reduce the substitution
bias that is present in the CPI-U. Between December 1999 and December 2000 (the only period for which final estimates of the C-CPI-U are
available) the inflation rate measured by the C-CPI-U differs from that measured by the consumption price index by only 0.1 percent.
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world markets fell again.
The average inflation rate over the four years
1994 through 1997 was 2.7 percent per year as
measured by the consumption price index. The
average inflation rate over the four years from
1998 through 2001 was 1.7 percent per year. The
core inflation component of the consumption
price index has fallen from 2.1 percent in the
earlier period to 1.6 percent in the latter period.
The conclusion from these observations is that
there has been a small reduction in trend inflation,
whether measured by the total or the core con-
sumption price index, over the past four years.
No estimates of the biases in the index are so
large as to suggest that the true rate of inflation is
now negative—that is, the U.S. economy is not in
a deflationary situation. What, then, is the origin
of the “deflation threat” that has been featured in
some economic and newspaper commentaries?
Some of these discussions appear to concentrate
unduly on particular prices and on short-run
data collected in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. The change in the
price index for personal consumption expendi-
tures for September 2001 compared with August
2001 was reported at –0.4 percent. The decline is
attributable to falling energy prices and to a sta-
tistical artifact of the decision made by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis in measuring insurance
claim payments as a result of the September 11
attacks. The December 2001 consumption price
index showed a decline of 0.2 percent for the
month and led to further press speculation about
deflation. Again, it is necessary to emphasize
that a focus on very short-term movements in
the price indexes can lead to misinterpretation
of the underlying trends of inflation or deflation
in an economy.
CHANGES IN RELATIVE PRICES
One of the great strengths of the U.S. economy
is that prices of individual goods and services
fluctuate freely. These price changes allow mar-
kets to signal how our productive resources can
be allocated most efficiently. The disparity among
inflation rates for particular goods and services
over longer periods of time is significant. From
1980 to 2000, the overall consumption price index
rose 95 percent. Consider price behavior in a half-
dozen categories within overall personal consump-
tion expenditures. Prices of personal computers
and peripheral equipment stand out: such prices
are estimated to have fallen by 99 percent since
1980. Note that despite this dramatic price decline,
people do not talk about the computer industry
suffering from deflation. This is a growth industry,
driven by dramatic innovations and increases in
efficiency.
Prices of durable goods are estimated to have
increased by 20 percent since 1980, considerably
slower than the general inflation over this period.
Prices of nondurables are estimated to have
increased by 65 percent since 1980; nondurable
goods prices have risen more than durable goods
prices, but still considerably less than the over-
all rate of inflation. Prices of food and beverages
are estimated to have increased 79 percent since
1980, somewhat slower than the overall rate of
inflation.
Consider some examples at the other extreme.
Since 1980, prices of tobacco and smoking prod-
ucts are estimated to have increased 480 percent
and prices of medical services by 197 percent. In
the tables that show prices by various sectors,
wide differences in experience such as those
mentioned here can be seen.
Are falling prices, or prices that increase
slowly relative to the general rate of inflation,
indicative of “hard times” for particular industries?
Sometimes, but certainly not always. Consider
personal computers and consumer electronics
in general (the latter is included in the durable
goods component of the consumption price
index). These are goods that have demonstratively
high income and price elasticities. What that
means is that the amounts consumers buy increase
a lot as incomes rise and/or prices fall. Over time,
as consumer incomes have increased and prices
have fallen, the size of the market for these high-
elasticity products has increased dramatically.
Color TVs, camcorders, VCRs, DVDs, and per-
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are all now common household items in the
United States. Many consumers can remember
when these products were either unknown or
owned by relatively few households.
This is an important point: expansion of the
markets for certain products occurred simultane-
ously with a fall in prices. Price deflation for
these goods was not inconsistent with prosperity
in the industries producing them. Indeed, declin-
ing prices were essential to expanding these
markets. The fall in prices was the result of rapid
productivity increases from innovations in the
production of these items and/or their compo-
nents. Firms found it profitable to cut prices and
expand production. Workers in these industries
found their improved productivity rewarded in
higher wages. Consumers, workers, and share-
holders all have benefited, even though prices
have fallen substantially over time.
High-demand elasticities are a critical element
in such success stories. In contrast, consider mar-
kets for basic agricultural products in the United
States. Productivity improvement in U.S. agricul-
tural production over the years has been tremen-
dous. Prices of these products have also fallen
relative to goods in general over the long run.
However, both income and price elasticities for
agricultural products are relatively low. Hence,
economic growth and declining prices have not
produced large increases in consumption. As a
result, fewer and fewer workers have been required
over time to produce more than enough output
to satisfy both domestic and foreign demand.
Farms have gone out of business, the number of
people engaged in agricultural production has
decreased, and in recent years farm income has
been sustained by large “emergency” farm appro-
priations out of the federal budget. Because of
the low price and income elasticities for agricul-
tural goods, deflation in this industry means hard
times for many farmers.
Health care provides a really interesting case
of relative price changes. In part, the rapid rate
of price increase here represents innovation in
the form of new products and/or improved pro-
cedures. Such price changes really reflect signifi-
cant quality improvements. Ideally such quality
improvements would be incorporated into the
measurement of a standardized unit of medical
services. With some consumer durables, such as
automobiles, statisticians have been quite success-
ful in measuring quality improvement. In other
areas, capturing quality change into the measure-
ment of a standard unit of output is difficult if
not impossible.
As an example, consider laparoscopic surgery
to remove the gall bladder. Not that long ago, gall
bladder surgery required a substantial period of
hospitalization, during which patient activity
levels were significantly restricted. Today, with
laparoscopic surgery, the length of the hospital
stay is much shorter and patient discomfort much
less. Moreover, the patient can resume reasonably
normal activity, including going to work, after a
short postoperative period. The patient and/or a
third-party payer may pay the surgeon substan-
tially more today to remove the gall bladder than
35 years ago, but does this increase mean that the
price properly measured is dramatically higher?
A well-constructed price index might adjust for
the reduction in the pecuniary cost of confine-
ment—fewer hospital days—from the improved
technology. However, it is unlikely that any price
index would reflect the improved quality of the
procedure represented by the reduced nonpecu-
niary costs of confinement and the shorter recov-
ery time now available. Hence the reported change
in the price index for such a procedure certainly
overstates the true rate of price change.
FLATION AND THE FED
The Fed’s goal is to maintain low and steady
inflation, so that expectations of changes in infla-
tion do not enter importantly in the decisions
businesses and households make. Using several
different measures of inflation expectations, it
is clear that long-term expected inflation has
changed little in recent years. There is no evidence
that changing inflation expectations figure impor-
tantly in economic decisions at this time.
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goods is consistent with stability in the overall
inflation rate. The variability serves to allocate and
reallocate resources across different sectors of the
economy, according to changes in consumer tastes
and differential trends in productivity advance-
ment. Simply put, it is normal that some industries
are growing while others are contracting.
A common business problem is to determine
a successful pricing strategy. One aspect of pricing
strategy is directly relevant to this discussion.
When a firm cuts prices to stimulate sales, it may
not be successful if its customers believe that even
deeper price cuts are around the corner. An expec-
tation of falling prices may, temporarily, reduce
rather than increase sales. It is for this reason that
generalized deflation can be so dangerous to the
economy. A widespread expectation of falling
prices may lead to declining demand across much
of the economy as people wait for lower prices in
the future. Declining demand may force layoffs,
which further depress household and business
confidence. Conversely, inflation expectations can
lead to rising demands and anticipatory buying.
Many analysts seem to view low inflation
and high employment as competing goals. That
is certainly not the only possible scenario. Main-
taining low and stable inflation contributes
mightily to overall economic stability. Consider
the situation in the weeks following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, when the economic
outlook was highly uncertain. The auto industry
was successful in selling a record number of cars
in October 2001 through price cuts in the form of
zero-interest financing. If consumers had reacted
by expecting even deeper price cuts and had
delayed purchases, the situation in early 2002
would have been very different. Overall, con-
sumers view price cuts in today’s environment
as a buying opportunity, not as a forecast of further
price cuts to come.
Clearly, the stability in the overall price
environment—stability in longer-run expecta-
tions—is what allows temporary price cuts to
work to boost sales and is an important element
in stabilizing the general economy. The current
U.S. situation does not match cases in the United
States and elsewhere that historically have been
associated with ongoing deflation. The Federal
Reserve pursued an expansionary monetary policy
throughout 2001 that has contributed to restoring
equilibrium to the U.S. economy. What policy
actions will be appropriate going forward will
have to be determined as evidence arrives on the
strength and durability of the economic expansion.
We must be vigilant, but today it is likely that we
enjoy flation—no “in” and no “de.”
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